From the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal, the Indian Navy plays a vital role in safeguarding our maritime frontiers. As the strategic landscape in the Indo-Pacific evolves, particularly with China’s growing naval presence, the need for a potent underwater deterrent becomes paramount. This is where Project 75I (P-75I), the acquisition of next-generation attack submarines, takes center stage.
The Navy has for years been left severely short of submarine platforms, which are a crucial means to attain naval dominance in its operational theatres. To address these shortfalls, the Navy since 1999, has been batting for operating at least 30 submarines by 2030 to maintain its naval supremacy in the IOR (Indian Ocean Region). This ambitious plan of the Navy has, however, been left in a limbo owing to failures with successive procurement programs.
With only few submarines now at its disposal, the Navy has been left grappling to maintain its footing in the region. Cornerstone to this ambitious modernisation program of the Navy is its P-75I (Program – 75 India) which was drafted almost a decade back for acquiring at least six diesel-electric ultramodern stealth submarines. Missing acquisition roadmaps and policies had meant that the crucial program had been in abyss for years. Much to the relief of the Navy initially, the government was working towards fast tracking this crucial acquisition program.
The program, which was first envisioned in 1997, aims to replace the force’s Sindhughosh-class submarines with a class of six attack submarines propelled by conventional means for the Indian Navy Submarine Arm. Originally envisioned in the late 1990s as a component of a 30-year plan to replace the Indian Navy’s current fleet of conventional submarines, the program has faced numerous delays due to obstacles arising from bureaucratic red tape, insufficient planning, and a lack of corporate competitiveness. As a result, the program’s timeline has been severely delayed, drawing harsh criticism.
The P-75I submarines boast Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) technology, a game-changer. Unlike conventional submarines that need to surface periodically to recharge batteries, AIP allows them to stay submerged for extended durations. This translates to greater stealth, making them harder to detect by enemy forces. With longer underwater endurance, these submarines can undertake far-ranging patrols, disrupt enemy shipping lanes, and gather vital intelligence discreetly.
The P-75I submarines are envisioned to be equipped with advanced weaponry and sensor suites. This includes modern torpedoes, anti-ship missiles, and electronic warfare systems. This enhanced firepower will enable them to effectively engage in anti-submarine warfare, counter surface threats, and launch precision strikes against targets on land.
The Indian Ocean Region is witnessing an alarming rise in submarine proliferation. With Pakistan and China actively expanding their submarine fleets, India needs to maintain a credible underwater deterrent. The P-75I submarines, with their advanced capabilities, will send a strong message to potential adversaries, dissuading them from any aggressive actions in our maritime domain.

Project 75I isn’t just about acquiring submarines; it’s a strategic investment in India’s indigenous defence capabilities. The “Strategic Partnership Model” adopted for the project mandates collaboration with a foreign manufacturer for technology transfer. This will allow Indian shipyards to gain expertise in constructing these complex vessels, paving the way for future indigenous submarine design and development programs.
India’s economic prosperity heavily relies on uninterrupted maritime trade through the Indian Ocean. The P-75I submarines will play a crucial role in safeguarding these vital sea lanes from piracy, terrorism, and potential disruption by hostile forces. Their extended range and underwater endurance will ensure a robust presence across the vast expanse of the Indian Ocean Region.
The IN issued a request for information (RFI) to multiple naval companies in 2008, including Armaris, Howaldtswerke-Deutsche Werft, Rubin Design Bureau, and Navantia, regarding the potential acquisition of submarines equipped with specific features.
An Acceptance of Necessity (AoN), the first official in-principle clearance for the P-75(I) proposal, was granted in July 2010 by the Defence Acquisition Council (DAC), the MoD’s highest authority on arms acquisitions. The original plan for the Defense Acquisition Council (DAC), which was presided over by Minister of Defense A. K. Antony at the time, was to construct three of the six submarines at Mazagon Dock Limited and one at Hindustan Shipyard Limited with foreign assistance. The remaining two submarines would be purchased directly from foreign vendors or private Indian shipyards, with a total budget of 50,000 crore.
Notification of the Strategic Partnership (SP) model, under which the acquisition program was processed, in May, 2017 and the introduction of the Request For Information (RFI) for the program itself in July, 2017 had set tone for the multi-billion dollar high stakes acquisition program.
After almost two year since the introduction of the RFI, the Government had officially set the ball rolling for the acquisition program by issuing the Expression of Interest (EoI) on 20 June 2019 for shortlisting potential Indian Strategic Partners (SP) for the construction of the six submarines.
Issuance of the EoI marked a major milestone in the INR 45,000 crore project which was floated as a follow up to the P-75 (Program-75). The stringent evaluation process itself was carried out in accordance to the guidelines laid down under Chapter – VII of the MoD’s Defence Procurement Program (DPP) – 2016 manual. Also dubbed the Strategic Partnership (SP) model, the guidelines mandate that a single shipyard be designated the SP partner for the program. This selected shipyard will then work with the down selected OEM for setting up a production line in India and then manufacture at least six submarines.
The evaluation process for the selection of the shipyard would be based on capability of the shipyard in the process of integration of system of systems and expertise in shipbuilding domain. Besides these criteria, the MoD would also be considering the financial strength and track record of the shipyard in executing prior projects. With a confirmed order for six submarines and with an option for buying another six platforms, the P-75I promises to be one of the biggest defence deals of the decade.
When the Government drafted the SP policy, the core strategy of it was to empower the Indian industry with capabilities to help the country realise its requirements for cutting-edge defence technology. Besides, the SP Model was also expected to create a level playing field for the private sector in defence manufacturing. The prologue of the draft manual itself had clearly indicated that the Government was very much inclined towards keeping out stateowned organisations from acquisition programs processed under the SP policy. Even the Dhirendra Singh Committee, which drafted the SP Policy, was of the view that this move would rival the unchallenged monopoly of state-owned Defence Public Sector Undertaking (DPSUs). It had also noted that such a move would greatly help in enhancing the country’s defence manufacturing capabilities by energising the private sector.

While the private sector was upbeat about the entire projects promised by the SP policy, it received a jolt when the Government, prematurely declared that DPSUs would be part of all acquisition programs on a nomination basis. This move by the Government meant that the private sector, which had a mere 6-7% share of defence contracts, had to battle it out with DPSUs, who had operated serving forces for decades.
Under the Program-75 India itself, L&T will now rival Mumbai-based MDL shipyard, which has been an active partner of the Indian Navy since 1965 in construction of both surface and underwater platforms. MDL, under the P-75 and prior Type-209 acquisition program, has developed unmatched capabilities in design and construction of underwater platforms. It also has enjoyed an unquestioned monopoly in the construction of submarines in the Indian market.
With L&T’s Kattupalli shipyard manufacturing the hull for India’s secretive ATV Project, under which the country received its first indigenously built nuclear propelled ballistic submarine, the company has enjoyed a unique capability in the country. The company through the course of this program had developed in-house capabilities for designing and developing critical equipment and systems. But the inclusion of MDL on a nomination basis has now virtually delivered a death kneel to the prospects of L&T. Apart from the technical advantages that MDL enjoys, the state-run shipyard also has a strong financial book, virtue of the large order placed up on it by the Indian Navy. The only factor in favour of L&T currently is its proven and reliable track record.
ThyssenKrupp Marine Systems (TKMS), in collaboration with Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited (MDL), and Larsen & Toubro (L&T), partnered with Navantia are the only ones in the race to acquire the project. The terms for the OEMs was to maintain a stringent indigenisation content of 45% for the first vessel and incrementally stepping to 60% for the sixth and the last. However, in the recent developments, both contenders have committed to a 60% indigenous content level from the very first submarine delivered.
TKMS and MDL have an added advantage as the Shishumar class submarines, which Indian Navy is operating, namely, INS Shishumar, INS Shankush, INS Shalki and INS Shankul have been developed by TKMS and have underwent a refit at MDL. These have been highly regarded by Indian Navy.
A confluence of factors is contributing to the slowdown is the Indian Navy’s desire for cutting-edge technology, particularly the highly desired Air-Independent Propulsion (AIP) system, has created complexities. Finalizing the exact endurance requirements for the AIP has been a sticking point. Foreign vendors might struggle to meet these demands within the stipulated timelines.
The “Strategic Partnership Model” hinges on knowledge transfer from foreign manufacturers to Indian shipyards. However, concerns exist regarding the extent of technology being offered and potential liabilities involved. This has led to apprehensions and negotiations getting bogged down.
The initial pool of contenders has shrunk due to stringent terms and complexities of the project. This reduces competition and bargaining power for Indian government. Furthermore, some foreign players might be wary of sharing sensitive technologies or facing potential legal disputes. While India aims to streamline the procurement process, bureaucratic red tape can still lead to delays in approvals and decision-making. This can further impede progress and discourage potential partners.
The delays in P-75I have several ramifications:
- Gap in Naval Capability: The aging submarines P-75I aims to replace are nearing obsolescence. Delays in acquiring new submarines create a potential gap in India’s underwater deterrence capabilities.
- Escalating Costs: Protracted negotiations and delays can lead to cost overruns. This can put a strain on already stretched defence budgets and limit resources for other modernization programs.
- Missed Strategic Opportunities: A robust submarine fleet is crucial for safeguarding India’s maritime interests in the Indian Ocean Region. Delays can hinder India’s ability to effectively respond to emerging security threats.
The P-75I program’s delays highlight the complexities of acquiring advanced military technology. While the Indian Navy’s pursuit of cutting-edge capabilities is commendable, the government must catalyse the decade-long delayed acquisition program. Addressing the current challenges with a clear-eyed approach will be vital for ensuring the program’s eventual success and bolstering India’s maritime prowess.