India’s move towards Integrated Theatre Commands represents a significant effort to reshape the way its armed forces are organised and employed. The creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the Department of Military Affairs in 2019 explicitly provided for restructuring military commands to promote jointness in operations, including through joint or theatre commands.[1] The reform, however, is about more than creating new headquarters or placing elements of the three Services under a common commander. Its larger purpose must be to generate greater operational integration and, ultimately, greater combat effectiveness.

The imperative for greater jointness is difficult to dispute. Modern military operations increasingly demand the coordinated employment of capabilities across traditional Service and domain boundaries. Yet jointness and integration are not synonymous, nor does organisational fusion automatically produce either. Each of India’s three Services has evolved its own operational philosophy, professional expertise and institutional culture in response to the distinctive demands of land, air and maritime warfare. The challenge is therefore to create unity of effort without diminishing the specialised knowledge and capabilities that make each Service effective.

This makes the present phase of India’s theatre reforms both consequential and complex. Former CDS Gen Anil Chauhan described jointness and integration as prerequisites for functional Integrated Theatre Commands, while emphasising that a joint culture must respect the uniqueness of each Service.[2] The question, therefore, is not simply whether India should move towards theatreisation, but how, when and in what form it should do so. Can a commander acquire sufficient understanding of the employment philosophies of two other Services to make optimal operational choices? Can coordination deliver the advantages sought from integration without forcing an artificial fusion? And, before a new command architecture is institutionalised, has it been sufficiently tested through operational experimentation?

“Joint Culture, though different from Service specific Culture, needs to respect the uniqueness of each Service.”
                                 — Gen Anil Chauhan, former CDS[2]

The Case For Jointness

The case for greater jointness arises from the changing character of warfare. Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, long-range precision fires, air defence, electronic warfare, cyber and space capabilities increasingly contribute to the same operational objective, often within a compressed decision cycle. India’s reform process reflects this wider understanding, with jointness and integration extending beyond command structures into operations and intelligence, capability development, communications, logistics, training and maintenance.[3] The challenge is therefore no longer simply to make the Services work together, but to determine how their capabilities can be organised and employed to generate a coherent operational effect.

Jointness and integration are related but distinct. Jointness enables different Services to operate together; integration seeks to align their planning, capabilities, information and decision-making around a common operational purpose. The objective must be to ensure that organisational integration strengthens, rather than substitutes for, the professional expertise required to employ each domain effectively. The distinction matters because the success of theatreisation will ultimately depend less on the architecture of command than on the quality of decisions that architecture enables.

The Theatre Commander’s Dilemma

A theatre commander will exercise authority over forces whose employment philosophies he may not have personally practised. An officer’s professional development remains predominantly rooted in his parent Service, where successive command and staff appointments build depth in a particular domain. Joint appointments and training can

broaden that understanding, but exposure is not the same as operational mastery. The challenge becomes acute when scarce capabilities from different Services have to be prioritised against competing operational objectives. The commander must understand not merely what another Service’s capability can do, but how and when it is best employed, what constraints govern its use and what is lost when it is committed elsewhere.

The Cross-Domain Commander

Theatreisation will place new demands on the professional development of senior commanders. The Services have already expanded joint exposure through tri-Service institutions, joint training and professional military education.

The 2024 Defence Services Technical Staff Course, for instance, brought together 166 officers from the Army, Navy, Air Force, Coast Guard and friendly foreign countries, with an emphasis on understanding the unique capabilities of each Service for multi-domain operations.[4] The Defence Services Staff College has also institutionalised the Deep Purple Division, with tri-Service officers undergoing dedicated training to strengthen inter-Service awareness.[5]

The next step must be to convert such exposure into cross-domain competence through sustained joint planning, cross-domain wargaming, realistic tri-Service exercises and greater familiarity with the employment philosophies of sister Services. The aim is not to produce commanders equally expert in every domain, but commanders capable of making informed choices across domains while drawing upon deep Service-specific expertise. That distinction will be central to the credibility of any future theatre command.

Preserving The Strength Of Three Services

Integration should not be confused with homogenisation. The Army, Navy and Air Force have developed distinct professional cultures and employment philosophies because the operational problems they solve are fundamentally different. Their strengths lie partly in that specialisation. The objective of theatreisation should therefore be to create unity of effort without eroding Service competence. Gen Chauhan’s formulation of a joint culture that respects the uniqueness of each Service is instructive: integration should seek to distil the best of each Service rather than settle for a common denominator that weakens all three.[2]

The implication is a more nuanced model of integration: common operational planning, interoperable networks and shared objectives, while retaining the specialised doctrines, training standards and professional expertise that enable each Service to perform its primary role effectively. Jointness should enlarge the operational choices available to a commander, not diminish the quality of the individual capabilities being brought together.

Coordination Or Fusion?

The distinction becomes important when considering whether every form of jointness requires structural fusion. Air Chief Marshal A. P. Singh’s latest remarks are significant. On 22 August 2026, he clarified that the IAF was “not against” theatreisation, but argued that India should first identify what is actually wrong with its existing arrangements and then develop a structure suited to its own requirements. He advocated a graded, step-wise approach that would minimise disruption and cautioned against adopting a “pre-baked” model from another country.[6]

Operation Sindoor provides a useful illustration of what integration can achieve without requiring complete organisational fusion. The Ministry of Defence highlighted how the IAF’s Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), the Army’s Akashteer and the Navy’s Trigun worked together to create a joint operational backbone and a unified real-time operational picture.[7] The lesson is not that coordination can replace integration, but that integration should be judged by the operational effect it produces, rather than by the degree of organisational fusion it achieves. 

Operational Experimentation Before Finality

Theatreisation also raises a question of timing. India has considerable experience of joint operations and exercises, but limited experience with a permanent integrated theatre-command architecture. That experience cannot be created overnight through a change in organisational charts. Nor would it be prudent to wait for another war to expose weaknesses in the system.

The more responsible course is deliberate operational experimentation: increasingly complex tri-Service exercises, realistic adversarial wargaming, temporary theatre-level command arrangements and rigorous post-exercise assessment. Such experimentation can test command relationships, allocation of scarce capabilities, communications, logistics and decision-making under pressure before the structure becomes fully institutionalised. Theatreisation should therefore be viewed as an evolutionary process of learning and adaptation, rather than a one-time organisational event.

The 2047 Test

The ultimate test of theatreisation will be whether the architecture remains relevant to the force India is seeking to build for 2047. Warfare is already becoming more dependent on artificial intelligence, autonomous systems, space, cyber, electronic warfare, persistent surveillance and long-range precision effects. Current CDS Gen N. S. Raja Subramani has highlighted the growing importance of artificial intelligence, cyber capabilities, autonomous systems, information warfare, space technologies and data-driven decision-making, while stressing the need for greater jointness, integration and collaboration.[8]

The implication is significant: theatres cannot become rigid geographical boxes built around today’s platforms. Their command architecture must remain capable of absorbing new technologies and reallocating capabilities as the character of conflict changes. Theatreisation must therefore create adaptability, not merely reorganise existing forces.

An Indian Model

India should learn from foreign experience without importing foreign organisational templates. The United States and China offer useful examples of joint command structures, but they evolved within very different strategic, institutional and geographical circumstances. India’s model must reflect its own threat calculus, geography, force structure and operational requirements. Air Chief Marshal A. P. Singh’s recent caution against adopting a “pre-baked” foreign model reinforces this imperative.[6]

The objective should not be to replicate how another military organises itself, but to determine how India can generate the greatest operational effect from the forces it possesses and the wars it may have to fight. The Indian model should emerge from operational requirements, experimentation and experience—not from organisational imitation.

Conclusion

India’s theatre reforms are necessary, but their success will depend less on the creation of new command structures than on the quality of integration they produce. Jointness must translate into faster decision-making, better allocation of capabilities and greater unity of effort, without weakening the specialised expertise of the three Services. That requires commanders with genuine cross-domain competence, supported by deep Service expertise; institutions that encourage sustained joint learning; and an architecture tested through demanding operational experimentation before it becomes rigidly institutionalised.

The objective should not be theatreisation for its own sake. Nor should India reproduce foreign models simply because they have existed elsewhere. Theatreisation must be shaped by India’s own operational experience, strategic circumstances and future requirements. Its ultimate test is simple: whether it enables India to fight more effectively as one force than its three Services could fight separately.

References

[1] Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Press Information Bureau, Cabinet approves creation of the post of Chief of Defence Staff in the rank of four-star General, 24 December 2019. PIB — Creation of CDS and DMA

[2] Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Press Information Bureau, Jointness 2.0, that is developing Joint Culture in Armed Forces, is the way forward, says CDS Gen Anil Chauhan, 21 May 2024. PIB — Jointness 2.0

[3] Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Major Government-led Coordination Efforts Among the Armed Forces, 2025. Ministry of Defence — Jointness and Integration initiatives

[4] Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Press Information Bureau, Defence Services Technical Staff Course for the tri-services officers commences at Military Institute of Technology, Pune, 10 June 2024. PIB — Defence Services Technical Staff Course

[5] Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Press Information Bureau, CDS visits Defence Services Staff College, Wellington, 19 July 2025. PIB — DSSC and Deep Purple Division

[6] Air Chief Marshal A. P. Singh, remarks at the Air Vice Marshal Harjinder Singh (Retd) Memorial Lecture, Kanpur, 22 August 2026, as reported by The Tribune and The Times of India. The Tribune — IAF not against theatre commands The Times of India — IAF Chief on theatreisation

[7] Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Press Information Bureau, Operation Sindoor demonstrated Tri-Services synergy with unified real-time operational picture, 30 September 2025. PIB — Operation Sindoor and Tri-Service synergy

[8] Government of India, Ministry of Defence, Press Information Bureau, CDS Addresses Participants at the Fourth Edition of Tri-Services Future Warfare Course, 3 August 2026. PIB — Future Warfare Course, 2026