The 1971 Indo-Pakistan war or the liberation war, which lasted for around 13 days, is one of the shortest wars ever fought, yet left a lasting effect on India’s military and strategic circles.
Even though, India emerged victorious in its campaign and successfully liberated East Pakistan, the war brought several glaring problems of armed forces to the forefront.
The army, which was instrumental in liberating East Pakistan, had a herculean task in reworking its operational procedures. Internal committees mandated the army to effectively review the performance of its equipment, utilization of men power and rework several of its standard operating procedures.
One of the most glaring issues that emerged following India’s successful campaign was the failure of its main battle tanks to effectively counter hostile mechanised forces. Under the command of Indian Army, the aging British-origin Vickers Mk-1 and Soviet-origin T55 tanks were serving.
A Soviet Origin T-55 Tank that once formed the mainstay of the Army; Source – Net
Both these tanks failed to perform reliably in the scorching Rajasthan deserts and in the plains of Punjab sector. This exposed a major deficit in army’s strike corps, which is instrumental in inflicting strikes deep into enemy territory during war times. Top military planners called for an imminent change in army’s well drawn order of battle.
An exigent need for a Main Battle Tank (MBT), which was designed and developed specially to meet Indian conditions, was felt across the corridors of India’s military power seat – South Block.
Further, India’s arch rival Pakistan was offered the American origin Abram Mk-1 MBTs and this set off alarms in the South Block. These futuristic tanks when inducted threatened to further tilt India’s supremacy on the battlefield.
MBTs, which form the core of any military’s strike power play a pivotal role in the fluidic battlefield. Utilising their unmatched firepower and cross-country mobility, these weaponry platforms can effectively soften enemy strongholds to assist assault by the infantry. Further, these MBTs are responsible for inflicting devastating attacks deep inside hostile territory during conflicts.
By 1972, Army’s Directorate General of Mechanised Forces (DGMF) had formally demanded for a tank that would feature high mobility, excellent protection for operating crew and a tank with superior fire power.
Further, army requested for a combat platform in the 40-tonne category, which would be armed with a 110-mm main gun capable of firing armour piercing high explosive rounds. The platform so developed had to traverse across cross-country terrain with unmatched power to weight ratio.
Even as the army scouted for foreign tanks, vendors declined to develop an MBT to exclusively match the Indian conditions citing economical viability. The 1974 ‘Smiling Buddha’ project, under which India tested its maiden nuclear device, virtually closed doors for import of military equipments as world powers imposed sanctions on India.
The country was left to fend on its own. Soon, a program was drafted to indigenously design and develop a MBT. With minimal technological knowledge and expertise, it was a herculean task for the developmental agencies.
The indigenous program took definitive shape after the government green lighted India’s premier defence research body – DRDO – to develop a MBT in 1972. Building requisite technological knowledge, infrastructure and cultivating the know-how and know-why knowledge became a key mission for DRDO. The path ahead was treacherous as the organisation would tread through uncharted territory.
© Karthik Kakoor
