Call Off Pakistan’s Bluff: India Must Revisit Its ‘No-First-Use’ Nuclear Doctrine

India’s Nuclear Doctrine

India’s nuclear doctrine is a hallmark of strategic restraint but not a sign of weakness. For over two decades, New Delhi’s commitment to No First Use (NFU) in the draft nuclear doctrine in the open domain has earned it the global image of a responsible nuclear power. But doctrines are not meant to be frozen in time. They are living frameworks, crafted not merely to impress foreign observers but to shape and deter adversaries. After the 2003 amendment, the doctrine says:-

• Any threat of the use of nuclear weapons against India shall invoke measures to counter the threat.
• Any nuclear attack on India in its territory or on its forces will result in massive counterstrike’s to inflict unacceptable damage to the aggressor.

Further, the doctrine was to be revised every five years. However, it has not been revised since 2003. Here again, lies an opportunity under which we can call for a review.

Today, the time has come to review, refine, and recalibrate this doctrine—not to abandon it wholesale, but to infuse it with conditional clarity and strategic ambiguity that speaks in the language our adversaries understand. India has the capability (Triad), the credibility of political will to respond, and so the strategic communication must not be weak or unheard.

Strategic Restraint Isn’t Strategic Submission

India’s NFU pledge, adopted formally in 2003, was built on three pillars: No First Use, Credible Minimum Deterrence, and Massive Retaliation. It was a wise doctrine then—mature, morally dignified, and calibrated for deterrence rather than warfighting.

However, the regional and global security canvas has changed.

• Pakistan’s development of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) and its aggressive first-use posture have diluted the credibility of India’s massive retaliation threat in the face of global pressure.
• China’s expanding arsenal, modernized delivery systems, and increasingly ambiguous nuclear signalling further strain the NFU framework.
• The evolution of missile defence, cyber warfare, and hypersonic delivery systems poses new challenges to India’s second-strike assurance.

In short, the credibility of deterrence is being tested—not by Indian inaction, but by adversarial provocation and technological transformation.

Why NFU Needs Conditionality and Ambiguity

Critics argue that abandoning NFU will erode India’s moral high ground and fuel an arms race. But moral credibility alone cannot deter battlefield adventurism. Deterrence, ultimately, lies in the mind of the adversary, not in UN statements or newspaper op-eds.

A conditional NFU—clearly stated to adapt to “changing threat perceptions and regional instabilities”—would:

• Neutralize Pakistan’s TNW bluff, making clear that any nuclear use, tactical or strategic, invites unacceptable costs.
• Raise the cognitive cost for Chinese planners, who currently benefit from India’s predictability.
• Reinforce India’s credibility in using all means to defend itself in a rapidly evolving conflict scenario.

Doctrines that are rigid signal weakness, not strength. The suggestion is not a reckless first-use policy, but a strategic ambiguity that keeps adversaries guessing—and restrained.

Lessons from Ukraine and the Iran-Israel Standoff

If history is the best teacher, contemporary conflicts are its case studies.

• Ukraine’s decision to give up its nuclear arsenal under the Budapest Memorandum left it vulnerable. When Russia attacked, nuclear rhetoric shielded Moscow from direct NATO intervention.
• In the Iran-Israel exchange, nuclear deterrence operated subtly but decisively. Iran’s missile barrage and Israel’s calibrated response reflect the fine balance of escalation control under a nuclear shadow.

India must draw the right conclusions. Deterrence works when the threat is perceived as real, timely, and resolute. A declaratory policy that guarantees retaliation, but not strategic surprise, may fall short in deterring limited nuclear use or coercive diplomacy.

Pakistan’s Nuclear Gambit: Time to Call the Bluff

Islamabad’s development of tactical nuclear weapons, along with its first-use nuclear posture as part of its full spectrum deterrence, aims to complicate India’s scale of conventional response. This dangerous posturing relies on the assumption that India’s NFU-based doctrine will remain shackled to massive retaliation, thereby paralyzing New Delhi’s conventional superiority. India has made it clear that it does not differentiate between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. A nuclear weapon is a nuclear war initiated and will get massive retaliation.

India must now publicly state—perhaps through a statement by the Raksha Mantri or NSA—that the NFU is conditional, evolving in response to strategic threats. Even a calibrated ambiguity—hinting that “any threat of use of nuclear weapons will be interpreted as first use, inviting a measured but decisive response”—would force Pakistan to recalibrate.

China’s Expanding Arsenal: A Different Challenge

China, though formally committed to NFU, has developed a highly sophisticated nuclear infrastructure, integrating space, cyber, and missile systems into a layered deterrence posture. It is reportedly lowering thresholds through military writings that allow nuclear use in response to major conventional losses.

For India, this means:

• Strengthening its nuclear triad, especially sea-based deterrence via SSBNs and soon, SSNs.
• Investing in hypersonic weapons, MIRVs, and advanced ABM systems to offset the growing asymmetry.
• Improving space-based surveillance, cybersecurity, and AI-enabled decision support systems to ensure survivability and credible second-strike capabilities.

India must also factor in China’s doctrinal ambiguity and capability opacity, making it necessary to evolve our posture—not through arms racing, but through smart, layered deterrence.

Recommendations: Building Strategic Teeth Without Escalation

1. Declare Conditionality in NFU: Without abandoning NFU, India should modify it to reflect “contextual deterrence”, signalling that threat of first-use threats or TNWs may provoke pre-emptive or proportional responses.
2. Strengthen Second-Strike Capabilities: Accelerate SSBN and SSN deployment, while integrating MIRV-capable missiles and hypersonic into the delivery matrix.
3. Invest in Deterrence-Enhancing Technologies: Develop space-based early warning, real-time tracking, secure command and control, and a national missile defence shield.
4. Enhance Doctrinal Ambiguity through Strategic Communication: Create confusion in the adversary’s mind—not clarity. Nuclear deterrence is a psychological game.
5. Bolster Diplomatic Signalling: Continue engaging with disarmament regimes while asserting that India’s evolving doctrine remains consistent with responsible nuclear stewardship.

Mind Games Win Nuclear Wars—Not Missiles Alone

India’s doctrine of No First Use once made perfect strategic and moral sense. But nuclear doctrines must evolve with threats, not remain imprisoned by past optics. The world has changed, and so have the stakes.

Pakistan’s nuclear sabre-rattling must no longer be indulged. China’s doctrine of strategic ambiguity must be matched with India’s cognitive warfare toolkit.

It is time India calls the bluff, reclaims initiative, and crafts a nuclear posture that is responsible yet unpredictable, firm yet flexible, and ultimately, credible.