Introduction
Islands are not just outlying spaces at the margins of national geography; they are strategic anchors of maritime power. Positioned astride critical sea-lanes and chokepoints, they influence trade routes, extend military reach, and enable blue-economy activities ranging from fisheries and shipping to tourism and maritime services.
However, islands are also ecologically fragile systems. Forests, mangroves, and coral reefs constitute natural capital. Indigenous communities possess constitutionally protected rights and distinct cultural identities. Climatic and seismic risks impose hard physical constraints on development. The devastation of the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami remains a sobering reminder.
Island policy, therefore, demands balanced statecraft. Security and sustainability cannot be pursued in isolation. They must move together. Strategic value and environmental stewardship are not competing goals; they are mutually reinforcing imperatives.
Islands as Instruments of Maritime Security
Across the Indo-Pacific, this understanding is increasingly evident. Governments are strengthening island infrastructure to secure maritime access and deter coercion. Ports, airstrips, fuel depots, and surveillance systems are being upgraded to ensure persistence and response capability.
China has fortified features in the South China Sea; Vietnam has expanded land-building across occupied Spratly features to sustain presence; the United States has reinforced Guam; Japan has deployed defensive systems along its southwestern islands; Australia is upgrading the Cocos (Keeling) Islands; and the UK-Mauritius treaty preserves the strategic utility of Diego Garcia. In each case, environmental compliance mechanisms exist, but strategy sets the pace.
Essential infrastructure comes first; mitigation and monitoring follow as integral design features rather than veto points.
For India, this strategic logic has become increasingly urgent.
Andaman and Nicobar Islands
As a peninsular state with three coastlines, India’s economic prosperity depends fundamentally on secure sea-lanes. Meanwhile, China’s expanding footprint in the Indian Ocean – from Hambantota in Sri Lanka to port development in Myanmar and reported surveillance activity near the Coco Islands – has intensified strategic competition.
In this environment, the Andaman and Nicobar Islands (ANI) assume central importance. Stretching from near Myanmar to close to Indonesia, the chain straddles the seam between the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. It overlooks the Malacca Strait and the Six-Degree Channel, through which a substantial share of global commerce – and Chinese energy flows – transits. Geography provides India with a vantage point. The challenge is converting that geography into sustained capability.
Historically, ecological sensitivities and tribal protections constrained large-scale development in ANI. Though justified, this left considerable strategic potential underutilized. Today, India is implementing a measured and calibrated approach to develop these islands into dual-purpose strategic strongholds and commercial hubs, prioritizing a phased rollout to uphold environmental integrity and Indigenous protections.
Transforming Great Nicobar into a Maritime Hub
At the heart of this strategy lies the initiative to develop Great Nicobar Island (GNI). The Island Development Agency, established in 2017, drives this initiative, guiding the transformation of Great Nicobar Island (GNI) into a primary logistics and connectivity hub within the archipelago. The core components include a transshipment port at Galathea Bay, a greenfield international airport, a hybrid power system combining gas and solar with storage, and a compact township to support operations. The aim is not mere construction; it is to convert remoteness into persistence – ensuring fuel, repair facilities, airlift capacity, and personnel presence on the island rather than episodic deployments from the mainland.
The strategic rationale is compelling. GNI lies near three major chokepoints—Malacca, Sunda, and Lombok – placing India alongside key east–west shipping corridors. Establishing a presence here improves maritime domain awareness, accelerates disaster response, and strengthens deterrence capabilities.
The economic case is equally significant. Currently, India relies on foreign hubs like Colombo, Singapore, and Port Klang for significant container trans-shipment, causing inefficient detours and economic leakage. A domestic transshipment facility at Galathea Bay would streamline logistics, retain maritime revenue within India, and reduce exposure to external policy risks, boosting trade resilience.
GNI is also increasingly supported by resilience-enabling infrastructure. The Chennai – Andaman Nicobar submarine fibre cable, commissioned in 2020, has significantly improved connectivity. Renewable energy projects, including solar installations with battery storage, are reducing diesel dependence. These investments bolster essential services, including command-and-control, telemedicine, education, commerce, and emergency response.
Addressing the GNI ‘Disaster’ Argument
The Great Nicobar development, however, has faced significant criticism due to concerns over environmental damage, habitat loss, and threats to indigenous communities. Critics highlight dangers to biodiversity, including critical turtle nesting sites. To address these, proponents suggest enforcing mitigation measures – such as turtle-safe lighting, dredging caps, and habitat buffers – directly into project contracts rather than treating them.
The social dimension is equally sensitive. The Shompen, classified as a Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Group, and the Nicobarese community possess distinct cultural identities and customary land systems. Critics fear cultural disruption, health-system strain, and restrictions on traditional access.
Institutional scrutiny has followed. In November 2022, the Tribal Council withdrew earlier consent, and proceedings before the National Green Tribunal have examined procedural robustness. It is important to recognise that the project has not proceeded without oversight. Forest and environmental clearances were conditional. The NGT constituted a High-Powered Committee to review identified gaps, and monitoring frameworks are in place. On 16 February 2025, a special bench of the National Green Tribunal disposed of challenges to the Great Nicobar mega infrastructure project, saying it found “no good ground to interfere,” as there were “adequate safeguards” in the project’s environmental clearance.
The Way Forward
The path forward now rests on demonstrable safeguards. Indigenous protections under the Andaman and Nicobar (Protection of Aboriginal Tribes) Regulation must be rigorously enforced, including no-contact rules for vulnerable groups, zoning restrictions, and meaningful consent pathways aligned with free, prior, and informed consent principles. Independent social audits can serve as phase-gate conditions. The debate over Great Nicobar therefore, is not a binary choice between development and environment. It is a test of sequencing, transparency, and institutional integrity. Security and economic foundations must be built, but ecological guardrails must be enforceable. Monitoring data should be publicly accessible where feasible. Renewable energy scaling should reduce logistical vulnerabilities. Tribal safeguards must have legal teeth.
Conclusion
National security and environmental stewardship are not adversaries. Maritime security itself protects marine ecosystems from illegal fishing, trafficking, and pollution. A forward logistics hub at Great Nicobar would strengthen deterrence, secure sea-lanes, and enhance disaster response capacity—all while operating within a framework of conditional approvals and judicial review.
If implemented with discipline and transparency, Great Nicobar can become both a frontline bastion of maritime security and a model of responsible island development. The challenge is not whether to develop, but how to develop—building the strategic spine while embedding enduring safeguards. Done right, it need not become a cautionary tale. It can instead demonstrate that strategic ambition and ecological responsibility can coexist in the service of national interest.
References:
- Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), “Island Tracker: South China Sea,” CSIS.
- Reuters, reporting on Vietnam’s land reclamation activities in the Spratly Islands.
- Naval Facilities Engineering Systems Command Pacific (NAVFAC Pacific), “Marine Corps Base Camp Blaz Overview.”
- The Diplomat, reporting on Japan’s island missile deployments.
- Parliament of Australia, Department of Defence, Cocos (Keeling) Islands infrastructure upgrades.
- Government of the United Kingdom (GOV.UK), Treaty arrangements on Diego Garcia and the Chagos Archipelago.
- “India’s Strategic Balancing in Navigating the Arc of Instability and Conflict,” published by the Vivekananda International Foundation on February 18, 2025.
- Ministry of Ports, Shipping and Waterways, Government of India, notification declaring Galathea Bay a Major Port.
- Department of Telecommunications, Government of India, Chennai–Andaman & Nicobar Islands Submarine Optical Fibre Cable Project (August 2020).
- Ministry of New and Renewable Energy (MNRE), Government of India, renewable energy projects in Andaman & Nicobar Islands.
- https://www.theindiaforum.in/environment/great-nicobar-island-hurtling-towards-environmental-catastrophe India Forum, CP Rajendran
- Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change (MoEFCC), Stage-I Forest Clearance (27 October 2022); Environmental & CRZ Clearance (11 November 2022). National Green Tribunal (NGT), Order (April 2023) constituting High-Powered Committee; MoEFCC compliance report (July 2025).
- https://bharatshakti.in/the-strategic-importance-of-the-great-nicobar-project/ , The Strategic Importance of the Great Nicobar Project, 16 February 2026
