Report card about India handling info war against it is not a very pleasant document to read. Our delayed communication, offering sparse information, or avoiding questions or all of the above and more have allowed narrative voids to open against us during fast‑moving crisis/emergencies. Since India was not the aggressor, so the said narrative void(s) became vital during fast paced military engagements like the Galwan clash and even Op Sindoor. Being quick and prompt does not mean sacrifice operational and tactical information but it has been seen that delay allows adversaries to define the story.
Before we start to discuss the contours of the real time war communication platform and a rapid response team, we need to understand that present and future generation warfare is and will be orchestrated as much in the minds as in the battlefield. The latest buzzword about mind warfare is cognitive warfare. Cognitive warfare may not get you absolute victory but facilitates the path towards the same. To understand the outlines of a real time war communication platform we need to discuss basics of cognitive warfare.
Cognitive Warfare
Genre of Cognitive Warfare is considered new. Honestly, it is old wine in a new bottle. The Mahabharata the epic treatise on warfare contains several episodes that resemble what modern strategists might call cognitive disruption. Chanakya emphasized psychological dislocation of the enemy even before physical deployment of troops—a precursor to modern cognitive warfare. This strain of warfare uses information, data and technology to influence and manipulate how people think and make decisions.
Cognitive Warfare has gained prominence because of media companies which in providing 24×7 news, control the global information ecosystem. They do not differentiate between good or bad news/info. These financial behemoths frame news/info selectively and as per an agenda (Hidden or otherwise). This is to keep the fight for so called realities and alternative realities always alive. Not to be left behind the monster of social media has allowed ordinary citizens to become broadcasters. This has blurred the line between reportage and propaganda. Books, articles, cleverly delivered or planted speeches /lectures etc cultivate information. Many international or domestic platforms (Think Tanks, NGOs, etc) regularly by organising panel discussions, conclaves, symposiums etc exploit word play to curate opinions. In a world were information and data is gold; everything sells and this forms the basis of strategic communications.
Successful strategic communications are the hallmark of efficacious execution of cognitive warfare. Strategic communications are characterised by being agenda based and pre-meditated. They are integration of all types of information invariably provided by government approved sources and instruments of national power. All this translates into comprehensive narrative(s). Importance of narrative is not just in its content(s) or its ability to influence minds but in its ability to spread like lethal wild fire. The recent Gen Z rising in Nepal is an example of the same. There have been instances where territory has been controlled by controlling the narrative. The British Empire maintained control of India through narrative dominance.
India’s Narrative Landscape
India is a rising global power with a hard-working Indian population. The population is craving for prospects and hence can also fall prey to susceptibilities. Information in India can be a boon or a bane. There are powers that are not happy with India’s rise. Every event in India, (Or in its neighbourhood) be it kinetic or non-kinetic now triggers an instantaneous information war aimed at shaping perceptions about India world over especially in global opinion centres. Adversaries such as Pakistan and China increasingly employ coordinated mis and disinformation campaigns, using AI‑generated content, riding on bot networks to frame India as the antagonist. This is to undermine public trust in India and abroad in Indian institutions. Amidst all this India has to have an ever-evolving narrative of its own to shape global perceptions about its policies, accomplishments, and future plans and narrative(s) to counter anti India narratives too. Such narratives cannot be an afterthought. This is so because every Indian irrespective of his/her background has opinions (Nothing wrong with it). If these opinions are not provided with the correct facts about a happening (Internal or External) or the incorrect facts are called out in near real time, one can say that the cat would have jumped the proverbial bag. This is why enmeshed real time war communication platform (To formulate the narratives) and a rapid response team (To counter info war) are a must in India.
Contours of Real Time War Communication Platform
Analyses of recent conflicts have shown that Indian communications are invariably reactive. For the above platform to take shape, gaps in India’s strategic communication architecture need to be studied in full entirety and the gaps need to be filled. To start with, the constitution, running and anchoring of the platform has to leverage cross India expertise, be a public-private effort and not be absolute top driven. The policy and strategy making should be central whilst execution should be decentralised with local peculiarities embedded. The platform has to look beyond routine governance communications. It should be akin to Strategic Communications and Information Operations Centre under the National Security Council Secretariat, with all of its mandates approved by the Cabinet Committee on Security. The platform / centre should have branches all over India and in important Indian embassies and missions abroad. The feedback loop has to be near real time. An inbuilt quality auditing ability would go a long way in making the entire setup purposeful.
Remit of this platform should be carefully sculpted. It should not be loaded with sundry topics/issues to deal with. Communications on defence, internal security with national‑security implications, major grey‑zone incidents and areas similar to these should be the speciality of this platform. Quality research on both internal and external (present and likely on the horizon) issues and advice to all concerned should also be the star activities of the platform. Interaction with similar international platforms / centres will only enhance the incisiveness and stature of this centre. Close coordination with MIB/PIB for public dissemination and with state governments when incidents are localised but have national or international ramifications would be extremely important.
Since it is to be a real‑time war communication platform, its functional modules have to be functional 24×7 while working in close coordination with MEA, MoD, and MHA to ensure that messaging aligns with legal, diplomatic and operational considerations. Since the platform will be required to continuously monitor the vast multilingual and a hostile information landscape, language and geographic expertise level will have to be uncompromising. Rapid release of statements, infographics, explainer videos etc would have to be platform’s stand out characteristics. Direct liaising with required ministries for them to take up cases with internal &/ or external agencies/companies/platforms for takedown of demonstrably false, harmful content would amplify India specific authoritative information. The platform will have to brief the Indian Parliament on matters it is mandated to execute and also be the go-to expert for exercises with armed forces, police, and diplomats to embed Info-Ops in their planning and wargaming.
The academic work of the platform will be vast but crucial. The employed experts have to conduct reviews of each major incident, examining which hostile narrative(s) gained traction, which response(s) succeeded or failed, how coordination mechanisms performed etc. It will have to recommend legal actions where necessary against entities (domestic or international) involved in spreading harmful disinformation, especially when it incites violence and / or undermines national security. The platform has to be the go-to specialist to obtain lessons to keep India’s doctrine on information warfare contemporary. When required, the platform will have to publish explainers about India’s choices during a crisis. This would go a long way in India’s favour especially when battling for democratic accountability.
The AI‑enabled tools should be the working tools. AI tools using satellite imagery, metadata analysis, and open‑source techniques that can rapidly geolocate and verify images/ videos would be the ask of the day. There have to be specialised AI tools to analyse, segregate and aggregate OSINT feeds and classified inputs to come up with a comprehensive picture. There have to be models to flag and alert about emerging narratives, coordinated bot activity, deepfake videos etc related to India. For highest level of collaboration among multi‑agencies work there have to be user-friendly secure tools with appropriate access controls. Cyber security has to be unprecedented. The bottom line of the working of the centre will have to be to integrate with existing structures, not duplicate but rather fuse and empower existing nodes.
Outlines of Rapid Response Team (RRT) to Counter Info War
The Rapid Response Team (RRT) should be a standing, cross‑domain unit within the platform discussed above. Depending on the severity of the incident, the team should have a colour coded response depicting its readiness levels. The team should be responsible to the NSA through a team of officers as designated by the NSA.
The composition of the team should be representatives spread across varied fields like political representative from the PMO, senior reps from MoD, MHA, MEA, ministries like Ministry of Electronics and Information Technology (MeitY), Law, Information and Broadcasting etc, the three Services, CAPFs, representation from key Indian missions abroad, Cyber, Intelligence & Forensics experts and OSINT and digital‑forensics analysts. When required MEA spokespersons, the PROs from the three services and designated experts (Based on the nature of the crisis) should face the media.
Functioning of the team has to be under astute supervision focusing on time sensitivity and therefore supporting decentralised execution. This is more so because activities of the team have to cover the three phases of every crisis i.e. pre, present and post. The bandwidth of the team cannot get saturated at any giving time in handling multiple crisis/scenarios (Some have happened, some are happening and some might happen). The team under the guidance of the Platform should be competent in narrative pre‑positioning, updating the narrative, explaining and if required arguing the narrative justifying Indian actions under international law. The team members have to be savvy to establish the rapport with domestic and foreign journalists. Diaspora, Indian and India sympathetic interlocutors abroad (In Political parties, Think Tanks, Businesses, Academic Institutions etc) have to be engaged for international outreach albeit through own embassies and missions. Conducting briefings and explaining Indian redlines, doctrines and governmental stance(s) on issues (At hand/Emerging /Likely to emerge or All) have to be team’s forte. The team has to have the competence to fully anticipate, understand and clarify the misunderstandings that are emerging in domestic and/or overseas audiences. Since the team is suppose to be single-source messaging outlet, correctness of facts should be paramount.
Conclusion
The world over, information hording and its exploitation is the new and a dangerous weapon. India adversaries use erudite, persistent campaigns to delegitimise Indian actions. This has direct bearing on the international support India thus receives. This is a major complexity of modern cognitive warfare. A dedicated, real‑time war communication platform—anchored in the NSCS, technologically advanced, legally grounded, and staffed by a multi‑disciplinary Rapid Response Team—would allow India to move beyond reactive rebuttals to proactive narratives. Properly designed safeguards can ensure that this capability strengthens India’s democratic fabric; while giving the state the tools it needs to defend its interests in the information battlespace of the 21st century.
