The incursion in Kursk involved a single combat group of about 50 armored vehicles and around 100 B-vehicles. The armored vehicles advanced in a broad formation, with an interval of approximately one kilometer between each vehicle. They penetrated 10 to 15 kilometers into Russian territory, covering an area of no more than 750 square kilometers (50 × 15 km). Although Ukraine claimed to have covered 1,000 square kilometers, Russia maintained that the incursion covered around 600 square kilometers.
The Ukrainian forces moved their artillery, with a range of about 10 to 15 kilometers, to provide supporting fire to their armor. Drones offered immediate air support. Adequate air cover against aircraft and missiles was provided in this area by NATO’s air defense systems. As a result, this incursion was able to sustain itself for nearly two weeks, with Russian air and armored counterattacks proving ineffective against heat-seeking anti-armor drones, while their missiles failed to penetrate the air defense systems.
Russia then regrouped its attacks on other parts of Ukraine that had limited or depleted air cover, utilizing its air force and missiles. Ukraine attempted to counter these strikes using F-16s; however, the poorly trained Ukrainian forces were unable to operate the F-16s effectively, leading to the crash of one aircraft. Additionally, several gaps in Ukraine’s air defense were identified and exploited, resulting in the dismissal of Ukraine’s air force chief.
The battle at Kursk offers several important lessons, one of the most significant being the importance of training with the equipment you possess. While borrowed equipment may offer partial success in certain areas, it is challenging to maintain control without proper infrastructure. Tactical advantages can only be fully realized if supported by sustainable strength in all other sectors of warfare.
Ukraine will now have to retreat with a bloody nose, learning the hard way that it’s better not to advance until your defenses are firmly in place.
