In a positive development on the arduous talks between India and China on disengagement and de-escalation in Eastern Ladakh, the External Affairs Minister and Foreign Secretary confirmed breakthrough in the contentious Depsang and Demchok areas on 21 Oct 24. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri said “India and China have reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements along the LAC in border areas leading to disengagement and a resolution of the issues that had arisen in 2020 and we will be taking the next steps on this.” This means that Indian troops can patrol up to Patrolling Point (PP) 10 to 13 in the Depsang Plains, and in Charding Nullah of Demchok. Fast on the heels of this announcement came the news of a bilateral meeting between PM Narendra Modi and President Xi Jin Ping. China on its part also confirmed on 22 Oct 24 that the deal was reached.
This is certainly a welcome development in an ongoing standoff which has lasted over four years during which both the militaries have been deployed forward. Substantial effort has been directed in deployment and subsequent maintenance of personnel and equipment. But this has been a great learning experience at all levels tactical to strategic in planning, synergizing and conducting operations in this theatre. This has also been a valuable experience for the personnel deployed in the area. Our equipment has got tested and has gone through a process of improvements to operate in challenging environmental conditions.
The eastern Ladakh crisis has been unique, we always lamented poor infrastructure on the Indian side of LAC and rapidly developing infrastructure on the Chinese side, this crisis actually highlighted the value of good infrastructure in forward areas. Numerous limitations were faced by the armed forces when the crisis first developed in Apr-May 2020. This operation has highlighted how quickly the services can synergise and plan joint operations and work together in adversity.
There were face offs between the troops while President Xi was visiting India in 2013 and 2014 and later in 2017. There have been few stand offs after May 2020 in January 21 and December 22 in the eastern sector. Minor face offs also took place elsewhere along the LAC. While the military talks have been regularly held on either side of the LAC, diplomatic efforts were provided impetus by the meeting between the two leaders in August 23 and subsequent meeting between Dr. Jaishankar and his Chinese counterpart Wang Yi in Jun 24, so also the talks between Indian NSA and Chinese foreign minister Wang Yi on 12 September 24 in St Petersburg. This indicates that while there were no formal talks at high level, but the back channel dialogue continued and more importantly, both countries appeared keen in resolving this impasse.
What could be the reason for China agreeing to restoration of patrolling rights in Depsang and Demchok areas where it was unwilling to even discuss these since Sep 2022. Chinese economy is not doing well and its equation in the region with other nations is also not evolving in its favour. It seems economics on both sides and China’s aspiration of gaining recognition in a multilateral world are the two main drivers of this agreement. The BRICS meeting afforded diplomatic space to both nations to agree for meeting between the two leaders on the sidelines of BRICS summit. Both Russia and China want India to remain committed to Global South and somehow stymie US efforts at propping up India as a balance against China in the region. For India there are major diplomatic, military and economic implications. As far as China is concerned it stands to enhance its stature by diplomatically resolving the situation at least for now and gain some credibility it has been slowly losing in the region and across the world.
While both the External Affairs Minister and Foreign Secretary have publicly spoken about the agreement, Chinese confirmation came through its foreign ministry spokesperson. Even in the summit between PM and President, it was the PM who spoke about agreement while the President spoke about managing disagreements. But the fact is that China is looking at long term goals of becoming a super power and achieving its ambition of surpassing the US GDP. For India also it is about concentrating on its goals of becoming a global power and bringing about multi polarity.
This agreement is just the beginning of potentially protracted negotiations between the diplomats and military representatives from both sides. Clarity will follow on nuts and bolts of implementing the agreement which is beneficial to both sides. Especially for India, it should not lose any territory or areas. And the de induction of troops, equipment and aircraft would be the last action on ground.
China’s three warfare strategy is focused at gaining territory from nations with whom it has contested land borders. This strategy is therefore, aimed at India and its neighbours in South and East China seas. This strategy is synergized with its overall strategy based on cost, efficiency and cumulative long term pay offs. China would like to make gains without fighting and will exhibit patience in this process against its adversaries. This is exactly what it did in Eastern Ladakh. Salami slicing of territory is an integral part of three warfare strategy which was implemented by China in Eastern Ladakh. Now by reaching an agreement on reinstating patrolling rights it is once again displaying its ambivalence to resolving the border issue. So, the uncertainty of another misadventure in the future remains. Hopefully, India will, as time progresses insist on guarantees on status quo ante, or perhaps work out an agreement which could be different than the agreements of 1996 and 2013.
While the agreement has been reached in principle, there are many rounds of talks still left to thrash out the details and that is where the devil lies. India must insist on status quo ante of the situation prior to 2020. This entire process will be executed in three phases, disengagement, de-escalation and de-induction. It is felt that China will continue to insist on its 1959 claim line. Fortunately, both the leaders have agreed to nominate Special Representatives (SR) from either side. Sh. Ajit Doval, NSA will be the SR from India and Mr. Wang Yi the Chinese Foreign minister will be the SR from China. These SRs will discuss the way forward in resolution of border issues.
What should India do now? We must take this opportunity to build both capability and capacity. Infrastructure would need determined investments to achieve last mile connectivity and strengthen our ability to mobilise rapidly. Distance of deployment of troops from LAC is no longer the datum, time to mobilise and be effective for warfighting for either side must be the criteria for depth of deployment henceforth. Enhance technology for persistent surveillance opposite LAC by augmenting our ISR resources. Integrate ISR resources of services to enhance interoperability and efficiency. Maintain a strong posture without any provocative action.
Identify shortcomings faced during the current deployment and address them in a timebound manner. Try and bridge the technological, Cyber and Space asymmetry that presently exists and retain the training and tactics advantage that India holds. Recent conflicts like the Russia-Ukraine and Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah-Iran-Houthis, have highlighted the importance of rapid production capability, especially of critical equipment and weapons. This calls for investment in technologies and capacities which can rapidly scale up production when the need arises. Thus simple, open architecture, modular weapons and systems need to be developed which will ensure that we don’t have to maintain large inventories. Private industry will have to step up to meet these requirements. An example is the Barracuda family of cruise missiles developed by Anduril industry in USA with a range of more than 500 miles with a payload of about 50 kgs and loitering time of about two hours. Interestingly the weapon can be assembled by minimally trained personnel with unspecialized tools. Imagine, a transport aircraft minimally modified launching a large number of cruise missiles from well within our territory without being threatened by enemy A2/AD strategy.
Other areas which need attention and capability enhancements are Space awareness, encrypted communications, resilient networks, joint decision support systems, utilization of AI in operations and maintenance to ensure higher availability of resources, long range precision weapons, UAVs and Counter UAS systems which can deal with full spectrum UAS operations from tactical to strategic and layered Air Defence. All the equipment should be able to operate for long duration and in extreme weather conditions at elevations envisaged for deployment.
Both India and China will remain competitors and the relationship is likely to remain capricious in the foreseeable future. India’s relationship with USA, Quad membership and Indian stance on rule-based order will continue to cause friction and lack of trust between the two countries. China will remain unpredictable, its actions in the region and its hegemonistic tendency can only be countered by viable military capability and a strong voice in the global commons. Rapid deployment during the eastern Ladakh crisis had sent a convincing signal to China, hence only credible deterrence will work in the future, which will also allow India negotiating space from a position of strength. China is unlikely to accept multipolarity in Asia and this is likely to become another sticking issue in the relationship.
It is not likely to be business as usual between the two countries in the near future. While this agreement is a welcome step, trust can only be restored one step at a time. For now, it opens opportunities for reducing the forward deployment of troops in a phased manner and peace and tranquility to return to the eastern Ladakh region bordering China. It will also allow the military to direct more resources to capability building. It is important though that the eye is not taken off this region and ensure there are no surprises.
