It must have begun a long, long time ago when one of our ancestors, who must have been either very smart or very weak, or a little bit of both, decided to hit his opponent by throwing a stone rather than getting up close and personal. The evolutionary cycle that started on that day continues even today: finding ways and means to inflict pain, hurt, or damage without exposing oneself to danger.
The latest manifestation, the use of unmanned platforms for this human penchant, began sometime in the early 2000s with the Global War on Terror and is now also visible on the battlefields of Eurasia and the Middle East. Broadly speaking, we have seen the evolution of these unmanned platforms, from the ultra-expensive, high-endurance, and extremely precise versions like the Reaper System, to the less expensive, mid-level endurance and precise versions like the Bayraktar, to cheap, limited endurance, and limited precision versions. Each of these types has found its niche utility, and it will be prudent to have a diverse holding of these assets to secure our national interests.
India is taking great strides in absorbing these technologies and capabilities into our security ecosystem.
In this context, two aspects of design and development planning are relevant. Firstly, if we consider that the first official use of drones was in the early 2000s during the Global War on Terrorism, based on the 50-year cycle postulated by Simpkin in his book “Race to the Swift”, and factoring in the improved pace of technological development, we are somewhere on the downward curve of drone technology. This implies that, given the development of counter-drone technology, drones no longer enjoy absolute asymmetry on the battlefield.
Secondly, given the gestation period for identifying capabilities, developing prototypes, conducting field trials, and aligning production timelines with economic considerations, there is a real possibility that by the time our drones are manufactured and inducted into the field army, much of the technology and capabilities will be approaching obsolescence.
The reason behind this article is simple. The internet is awash with videos and images that claim to be evidence of the lethality of drones on the battlefield. While there is exhaustive literature extolling the technical aspects of these machines, these two-minute clips on social media only reveal the tip of the iceberg and may not provide workable guidelines for all stakeholders involved in their development and use.
This paper, however, is not intended to give the reader technical insights on drones per se. Rather, it aims to explore the direction we must take if we aspire to gain similar capacities and capabilities from the perspective of defense production under the Atma Nirbhar Bharat initiative.
To maintain focus on essentials, we will classify drones into three broad types as indicated above: Ultra Costly and Ultra Capable (UCUC), Less Costly and Still Capable (LCSC), and Cheap and Possibly Capable (CPC).
Employment Philosophy
The UCUC drones bring extremely precise, lethal capabilities at long ranges. This capability, however, comes at a high cost, which becomes a constraint in both procurement and employment. These drones are ideal for strategic targeting across the spectrum of operations, but the cost of operation and each munition means they can only be used sparingly. Due to their precision, the decision to employ them must be retained at the highest level of headquarters controlling the operations.
The LCSC drones offer precise capability at medium ranges, making them more affordable and allowing for greater freedom of use. These drones are ideal for targeting objectives in the tactical battlefield. However, due to their reduced capabilities, they are easier to intercept and must be deployed in greater numbers. This allows the “yes” or “no” decision to be delegated to lower levels of command. These drones can be allocated like any other firepower asset for a specific time, operation, or effect.
The CPCs, with their ability to overwhelm a target by sheer numbers, are ideal for deployment at the grassroots level, empowering tactical leaders from platoon or company commanders onward. They must be inducted in substantial numbers and should be easy to make, use, and repair in field conditions. They should become integral weapon systems for the unit or sub-unit, with similar rules of engagement to enhance their area of influence.
Capability
The technologies for UCUC and LCSC drones have more or less matured, requiring only minor tweaking to meet our operational requirements. However, the technology for CPCs is still being developed. Critical areas requiring attention include endurance and payload. Achieving endurance of up to three or four hours and a payload capacity of at least three kilograms will substantially empower users at the tactical and sub-tactical levels and positively influence operations.
Emerging countermeasures suggest a need for improved encryption of communications between the user and the machine for secure operations. The electromagnetic spectrum is becoming increasingly contested, and future products should be able to operate in such conditions without causing undue challenges for other friendly users.
Munitions
The UCUC drones, with their extended endurance and capabilities, should be able to employ various types of weapons, each with precision capabilities. These weapons should range from those capable of eliminating a single individual in a crowd to those capable of bringing down a small building in an urban setting. The drones should be able to engage both moving and static targets, with flexible guidance systems ranging from “fire and forget” to “till impact.” Live transmission of the engagement and the ability to abort a mission will also be essential, given the strategic nature of the targets.
The LCSC drones will require heavier munitions, as they are likely to be deployed in the tactical battlefield. Ideal munitions include high explosives, high-explosive fragmentation with variable fuses (delay, impact, and airburst), and chemical energy warheads against armored vehicles. Tandem warhead chemical energy munitions will be necessary for engaging heavy armored vehicles. The munitions should feature “fire and forget” capabilities with sensor-fused terminal guidance.
The CPC drones, with their limited payloads, will need to carry the most effective munitions possible. At a minimum, they should carry both high explosives and chemical energy warheads capable of penetrating light armored targets. Given their limited weight, higher accuracy will be required for maximum effectiveness.
Logistics
The UCUC drones will require dedicated support from the original equipment manufacturer (OEM). Due to their endurance, their operating bases can be located at greater depths, where the OEM can provide repair and maintenance support. Adequate spares of critical parts and sub-components must be available at short notice, ideally from indigenous production.
For the LCSC drones, a forward-deployed repair and recovery chain is necessary. Each component—from the airframe to guidance, control, and power pack—should be modular and easy to replace in field conditions. “Stupid-proof” options for repair and replacement in the field will be needed. Sufficient quantities of critical assemblies, systems, and sub-systems must be available to minimize downtime.
The CPC drones should ideally be a “use and throw” variety, with modular parts and systems that are easily carried and replaced in the field. Different types must have interchangeable systems, with the guidance, payload, and power pack being the most important. The replacement process should be easy to learn and use, requiring minimal training.
Situational Awareness
The proliferation of drones in the tactical battlefield, especially the LCSC and CPC varieties, will present challenges related to airspace management. There is a need to design and develop a standalone system capable of mapping all drones operating in a defined area. This will ensure economy and optimization of effort while providing commanders at all levels with a common operating picture to facilitate decision-making. These systems should ideally be handheld with power packs capable of operating for at least 24 hours without a recharge.
Counter Systems
Each level faces a different threat perception and will require variable counter-drone capabilities. Vital areas and points will need both active and passive counter-drone capabilities, while passive measures will suffice at the sub-tactical level. Counter-drone systems should also provide early warning to allow users to adopt passive measures that enhance survivability. These systems should offer visual and audio cues and be both man-portable and vehicle-mounted, operating for at least 18 hours before requiring a recharge.
Interoperability
The control units for LCSC and CPC drones should be man-portable and battery-powered, with options to operate drones using relay stations to extend their range. The ability to transfer control to another unit or relay station should also be available.
Interchangeability of various systems and sub-systems among drone variants in the field would improve redundancy during operations and is highly desirable.
Force Structuring
The induction of drones into the armed forces significantly enhances our capabilities. The true potential of this can only be realized with dedicated and trained personnel to operate and maintain these systems. Three verticals are essential: commanders, operators, and support personnel. Since drone operations require dedicated effort from all stakeholders, optimizing only one vertical would result in suboptimal outcomes. It is necessary to allocate personnel for all three verticals at all levels of operation.
Many initiatives are already at various stages of development and procurement. The purpose of these suggestions is to provide an unconstrained perspective on the requirements for drone warfare without being overly restrictive or unrealistic. Given India’s penchant for “jugaad” at all levels, we have the potential to provide simple and effective solutions for the next generation of drone warfare.
