Since wide-sweeping reforms of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) began in 2015, efforts of the country’s defence apparatus are oriented towards creating an “integrated” force capable of fighting and winning “high intensity, short duration, localised wars.” Integration has been focal to prepare for achieving the intended goal, and has manifested itself in both doctrine and real-time combat preparedness exercises. In the Western Theater Command of the PLA, which has a primary operation direction towards India, requirements to make integration a reality are reflected, too.
The Science of Military Strategy (战略学) document published by the PLA Academy of Military Science in 2013, lucidly explains the pillars of Multi-Domain Integrated Joint Operations (MDIJO). The requirement is two-fold — that the services and support arms of the PLA fuse their operational expertise and platforms to the highest possible degree (i.e. preparing a “joint combat force”), and that they do so via a “seamlessly linked up networked military information system.” The former constitutes the material basis on which operational strengths can be complementarised and the boundaries and hierarchies of services and arms can be transcended. The latter constitutes the safe and reliable supporting link so that all operational elements have a common awareness of battlefield postures. Theater commands like the WTC have been essential in fulfilling this requirement.
Structurally, how is it playing out in the WTC?
Like all TCs, the Western Theater Command (WTC) itself rests under the direct control of the Central Military Commission (CMC), and the ground, air, and conventional missile forces assigned to it answer on operational matters to the WTC commanders, meaning that wartime mobilisation as well as combat preparedness are overseen by leaders of the WTC.
The WTC is unique as compared to its counterpart theaters in that it also boasts two group army/ sub-theater level Military Districts (MDs) in Tibet and Xinjiang. The two MDs further boast various infantry battalions, border defence regiments, and mountain infantry brigades. An example of an infantry battalion with a special assignment for border defence is the Gyantse County 1st Independent Battalion (Military Unit Cover Designator 77655). Placed under the ambit of the Tibet MD, this battalion is designated to be deployed for operations on China’s borders with India and Bhutan.
Under the WTC, there further exist two group armies – the 76th and 77th, and under their ambit exist various light, heavy and medium combined arms brigades (CABs), which are classified according to the weapons systems they predominantly integrate (light CABs are high-mobility, air-assault, mountain and motorised, and medium and heavy CABs include wheeled and tracked armoured systems respectively). Additional brigades specialise in operational elements such as an artillery brigade, an air defence brigade, army aviation brigade, a special operations forces (SOF) brigade, an engineer and chemical defence brigade (combined or separate), and a sustainment brigade.
Each theater command, including the WTC, also hosts a ‘Joint Operations Command Center” (JOCC; 联合作战指挥中心). As per a report of the PLA Daily from 2022, the WTC-JOCC has become the “smartest brain,” performing the role of strategising over and simulating battlefield performance (similar to a tactical wargaming ‘think tank’), while providing data and “intellectual” support for operational command. The report also suggests that the team at the JOCC comprises personnel from all four services, and most of them are aged 35 or under, and have won various “scientific and technological progress awards” during their educational years.
What Practices are Defining the WTC’s Combat Preparedness Efforts?
Terrain and altitude training is a central pillar of the WTC’s jointness capabilities, as the ability to achieve interconnected goals in complex environments would shape the results of conflict. Moreover, given that it is the largest theatre command by area and covers both the arid northwestern deserts of Xinjiang and the high-altitude areas of Tibet, along the border with India, adaptation to terrain and altitudes determines the ability of soldiers to fight protracted conflict and conceal postures without disrupting the sustainable flow of everyday resources to combat bases. Hence, both core and non-core combat tasks of the WTC are shaped to fulfill the requirements of terrain training.
Shovelling snow in the Tibetan mountains or in the high-altitude desert areas of Xinjiang is a core non-combat task required of WTC personnel. While it is a non-combat task, it has significant applications in combat work. For example, a CCTV report from January 2023 highlighted the significance of practising snow-shovelling for a Xinjiang border detachment. The detachment, based at the foot of the Barluk Mountains, faced 200 days of gale-force winds in the new year period that led to snow accumulation, estimated to be as high as 2–2.5 metres and extending as far as 60 metres from the detachment’s base. So, when members of the detachment undertook a border observation patrol and encountered severe snow accumulation, they demonstrated snow-shovelling skills. Then they had to reach the final patrol point on foot.
Further, WTC soldiers posted along the Kunlun Mountains (extending into Xinjiang and Tibet) have begun building army command posts concealed near snowlines at altitudes of over 4000 metres. The goal has been to continuously lead troops to conduct effective on-site research, planning and training in high-altitude zones. Officers in the command posts formulate measures for high-altitude training and preparedness and conduct concealment tests for soldiers, vehicles and tents, sometimes changing locations every few months. Then, soldiers are required to pursue other combat preparedness tasks, such as testing of marching speed over several hundred kilometres, as well as practising live-fire shooting to determine ballistic performance of artillery at various altitudes. From the Indian perspective, this is significant because, over time, some of those concealed positions and tactical arrangements have come to restrict Indian forces’ access to key patrolling points along the de facto border, the Line of Actual Control.
Electromagnetic warfare training is becoming increasingly significant to the PLA in general and the WTC in specific. With the realisation that China during battle will be in a “complex electromagnetic environment” (CEME) wherein there will be a need to deploy counter electromagnetic warfare to ensure systems security, in July 2022, the PLA inducted a new variant in FH-95 series of drones developed by Aerospace Times Feihong Technology. These drones are capable of performing electromagnetic jamming and armed reconnaissance, especially in border patrol scenarios. In fact, this latest variant is being first put to test by the Xinjiang MD. Further, to practise “effective concealment” (藏得好) in combat training, Air Force Brigades in the WTC have also been deploying measures to “clear the electromagnetic fog” in a scenario.
This refers to a situation in which radar systems experience interference, leading to the loss of the “enemy aircraft signal” (敌机信号). Together, the abovementioned efforts are indicative of a “whole-of-systems” approach to achieving joint operational capacity with air superiority at the core in the WTC.
Finally, given the “last-mile delivery requirements” of high-altitude zones specifically in the WTC, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are being adopted for transporting food and essentials to active personnel. This is in addition to the induction of the Xi’an Y-20 heavy-transport aircraft, the ‘Kunpeng’, which in 2021 demonstrated its capability to fly winter gear to border troops stationed along the LAC within seven hours. Evidence for the use of UAVs comes from a November 2020 drill conducted by the logistics departments of the PLA Army and the Tibet MD, wherein the goal was for a drone delivery unit to transfer hot food, drinking water, medicine and other urgently needed materials to personnel located at a base in the mountains, because the manned mobile transportation unit on the ground was “blocked by enemy fire.” The success of the drone delivery unit was determined by the fact that amidst bad weather and high altitude conditions, drone operators were decisive in making a comprehensive judgement on terrain, wind speed, temperature and other factors to ensure the drones’ safe landing at the predetermined area. It was further promised that the PLA Army logistics department is preparing to expand drone delivery to armament and ammunition supplies to active last-mile locations.
Conclusion
In an era where the Information Age is enabling Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), the PLA is adapting to new modes and methods of warfighting. Of these, MDIJO, informatization, and intelligentization are key to the PLA achieving its goal of becoming a “world class force” by 2049. To this end, the PLA WTC appears to be rapidly evolving its approach to enhance combat preparedness. Since its formation in February 2016, the WTC and its various sub-commands have developed standardisation of measures in everything from reconnaissance and fighting drills, to communications, transportation and delivery, with talent at its core. Over the next few years, it is only likely that the WTC doubles down on such measures, creating a joint force truly capable of conducting successful combat operations, especially under conditions of informatisation. In such a case, India must continue to observe developments in the WTC, and direct its efforts towards countering them.
