Introduction: A Show of Force at Zhuhai
At the recently concluded Zhuhai Airshow in Guangdong, China, a new unmanned combat vessel of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN), the ORCA, made its debut as part of the Asian giant’s naval arsenal. As official sources highlighted, this 500-tonne displacement high-speed stealth unmanned surface combat vessel, equipped with a diesel-electric dual-mode propulsion system, is capable of performing a host of tasks including Beyond-Visual-Range (BVR) fire strike, and air and missile defense. But perhaps what is most interesting, is its reported ability to perform anti-submarine search and strike autonomously. If true, the PLAN may just be ushering in a transformed era for China’s undersea warfare capabilities.
Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) seemed to be at the center of a range of weapons systems displays at Zhuhai. With integrated reconnaissance and strike drones, for example, the display of the Wing Loong-X was noteworthy for its new ASW capabilities. When the WLX was first displayed at the 2022 Airshow, it was referred to as Wing Loong-3, but only its potential to perform reconnaissance, ground strikes, and even communication relay tasks was depicted. This time around, the WLX was displayed as an operational unit, potentially signaling that the technology is now mature and deployment-ready. The weapons pods and the sonar buoy it featured at this Zhuhai indicated that it has the capability to be deployed for ASW. The weapons pods included anti-submarine torpedos the WLX can deploy. Further, commentators suggested on QQ, a Chinese social media platform, that a stack of WLXs can be paired with anti-submarine systems like the KQ-200, the PLAN Air Force’s ASW aircraft, to cover a vast area in a “submarine hunting” scenario.
Also debuted at the show was the Z-20J, an advanced version of the Harbin Z-20F aircraft. While the Z-20F has already claimed the capability to double the anti-submarine reach of the PLAN’s destroyer vessels and corvettes, the Z-20J is a step further. And even though open-source imagery has suggested that the 20J can carry Anti-Tank Guided Missiles (ATGMs), its primary role is supposed to be to conduct shipborne tasks such as transport, utility and anti-submarine combat.
Why do the Chinese Emphasise ASW?
A display of such capabilities can only mean one thing – that the PLAN is projecting the ability to defend its claimed maritime territories against threats posed by enemy submarines. But, and most importantly, China’s main goal in integrating ASW capabilities into its naval arsenal is to prepare the PLAN for fighting its primary rival in a vast array of hostile maritime theaters – the United States. Given that China’s current naval threat perception is exacerbated by the hostile situations in the Taiwan Strait, the South and East China Seas, and the Indian Ocean Region, it becomes pertinent to build a fighting force that can comprehensively deter military coercion across domains.
China has done well to both introduce the vitality of ASW in its military doctrine, and to seek lessons from the capabilities of the US and its allies. As per the Chinese Academy of Military Sciences’ ‘Science of Military Strategy’ document of 2020, the PLA must build ‘diversified fighting forces, focusing on a comprehensive struggle with multiple means’. A significant part of this approach is building an undersea fighting force that doesn’t just include submarines, but also ASW capabilities through the integration of surface ships, and shore-based and sea-based anti-submarine aircraft. Further, as part of its larger focus on winning wars in ‘informatised conditions’, the Strategy document urges the PLA to build anti-submarine technology that can circumvent electromagnetic interference in a complex ocean environment.
The doctrinal emphasis on ASW is enhanced by lessons sought from the progress the US and Russia have made in the domain, of which, the former is more problematic from Beijing’s perspective. Chinese military commentators have often cited examples from anti-submarine exercises conducted by the US and NATO to make the case that China must invest in ASW. And given that the PLA has had no formal warfighting experience in a long time, the focal point of such commentaries is to demonstrate how close such exercises are to actual combat scenarios.
For example, a commentary appearing in October 2021 in the Liberation Army Daily, the mouthpiece of the PLA, discussed the US’s “state-of-the-art ASW simulation trainer,” which, based on real data, provided a more immersive experience for trainees. This, the article lamented, may ultimately enable the US and its allies to be able to break through conventional deterrence in the ‘first island chain’. Similarly, a brief analysis appearing in December 2022 on Sohu, another Chinese digital platform, clarified that ASW will be the focus of NATO operations going forward, given that China and Russia are deploying submarine fleets in large numbers. Especially in the complex polar waters of the Arctic, NATO exercises like the ‘Dynamic Manta’ are a threat to Chinese civil-military projects. In this regard, the PLA, both doctrinally and operationally, is imbibing lessons on the value of ASW, as domains of contestation and China’s own threat perceptions evolve.
Trajectory Ahead
While China is increasingly focusing on ASW, as highlighted in the US Department of Defence’s recently published ‘China Military Power Report 2024’, the reality is that China lacks a robust deep-water ASW capability. This does not, however, mean that China is not invested in improvement.
For starters, China commissioned its eighth Type 055 RENHAI class guided missile cruiser in early 2023. Dubbed one of the best comprehensive destroyers China has, the RENHAI boasts a 112-cell Vertical Launch System (VLS) with the capability to carry not just Land-Attack Cruise Missiles (LACMs) and Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs), but also a diverse load of anti-submarine weapons systems. The vessel also carries a strong multifunctional S-Band AESA radar and an electronic countermeasures system, for long-range detection, surveillance, and precision while carrying out ASW. The aircraft hangars aboard RENHAI can also host the Z-20F aircraft, which is a popular choice in the PLAN for ASW.
Also, the PLAN is partnering up with the Russian Navy to together perform anti-submarine operations and test interoperability. Just recently, in October 2024, the Russian Pacific Fleet and the PLAN tested out joint capabilities in detecting and neutralising enemy submarines in the Sea of Japan. Together with a Type 055 destroyer such as the Wuxi from the PLAN, and a submarine detection helicopter like the Kamov Ka-27PL from Russia, the two countries can integrate capabilities in an ASW scenario in the future.
From the Indian perspective, such developments are important to take into account, for the execution of its own naval ambitions. As per the Indian Maritime Doctrine of 2019, ‘Sea Denial’ is a crucial component of operations surrounding the interruption of the enemy’s sea lines of communication, and the platforms of choice for such deterrence by denial are submarines. Given that India has recently invested in its ‘Advanced Vessel Technology’ (ATV) project to build powerful SSBNs, and is now planning to induct a nuclear-attack submarine by 2036, it must also comprehensively integrate stealth technology and/ or anti-submarine capabilities to meet the ‘China challenge’ in the IOR. As China has now built the world’s biggest maritime fighting force, India must assess threats in waters closer to home and respond accordingly.
