India responded to the most horrific terror act at Pahalgam, on 22 Apr 25 with Operation Sindoor. This was the largest counter terror cross border operation in free India’s history. The air strikes against nine terror HQs and camps were unprecedented and completely surprised the Pakistani leadership which least expected the scale of response. In fact, the cavalier response of the DGMO Pakistan to a call from his Indian counterpart on 07 May 25, clearly indicated Pakistani intentions to escalate, further underestimating Indian resolve. Operation Sindoor is a paradigm change in terror response, which redefined the use of force against acts of terrorism in the sub-continent.
What resulted over the next four days is a shining example of Anti Access/ Area Denial operations in the land, air and maritime domains by the Indian military. The operation also demonstrated the dexterity exercised by India in controlling the escalation and retaining this control till the declaration of pause in military action. It also demonstrated the nation’s will in deescalating at a rapid pace due to decisive leadership and powerful offensive action which forced capitulation of Pakistan.
Operation Sindoor also called the long-time nuclear bluff of Pakistan and reaffirmed the space for conventional military action against sun-conventional actions of Pakistan. It rendered the red lines prophesized by Pakistan redundant while, India drew fresh red lines against terrorism for which the responsibility now rests squarely on Pakistan, especially its military and ISI. This signals a major strategic shift in Indian doctrine.
While the entire operation exemplifies synergy and jointness, what stands out are the importance of airpower and joint planning and operations. Land played a key role on the LoC and some parts of the international border, maritime squeeze was evident in the Arabian sea, but airpower as instrument of choice in dealing with full spectrum of operations was once again highlighted. Broadly, operation Sindoor succeeded because of decisive leadership, offensive use of air power and jointness.
Operations Sindoor is ongoing and the news of General Asim Munir being promoted to the rank of Field Marshal is a clear sign of things to come in the foreseeable future. He and the ISI are singularly responsible for bringing the two nations close to an all-out conflict.
Role of Air Power
One of the objectives of the IAF, as enunciated in the Doctrine of the IAF is “To prosecute offensive parallel air operations to ensure achievement of the desired military or politico-military objective(s), independently as a Service or jointly with other Services.” The IAF fulfilled this objective explicitly in Op Sindoor, as it undertook annihilation of the terror camps and terror HQs jointly with the Indian Army using long range precision strike and loitering munitions in complete synchrony in mere 23 mins on 07 May 25. Immediately, after that the IAF adopted a robust defence posture to counter the expected retaliation from Pakistan. The strikes also highlighted the importance of accurate and timely intelligence for maximizing the effect. About 100 terrorists and their family members were neutralized in the strikes.
The night also witnessed the largest air battle of recent times involving more than 100 fighter aircraft, refuellers and AWACS/ AEW&C aircraft from both sides. Use of decoys succeeded in fooling the Pakistani Air Defence resulting in firing of large number of air to air and surface to air missiles. While some media tried to divert the narrative in trying to compare two aircraft and their weapon systems, this operation was much more than that. Application of air power is a highly scientific and deliberate process dependent on meticulous planning and methodical execution which unraveled in the subsequent days.
Operation Sindoor rapidly evolved into classic conventional operation involving control of air and execution of air power roles like offensive counter air and defensive counter air. Classic Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD) and Airfield Strikes were major tasks executed by the IAF along with Air Defence against enemy attacks against military and civilian targets. This operation hence evolved from use of air power in sub conventional role to classic limited conventional roles. It also showcased the coercive ability of air power. The air power was utilized in many of its contemporary roles barring a few.
The resilient Air Defence sensor grid was achieved by integration of sensors like the ground radars, Air Defence weapon system radars, AWACS, AEW&C and the Indian Army sensors into a single network, the Integrated Air Command and Control System (IACCS), into which the Akash Teer plugged in. This provided clarity in air space management and fire control for diverse weapon systems. The biggest achievement was to accomplish this integration over the entire length of the border with Pakistan, something never exercised since the 1971 war. This was also a complete border response synchronized at the national level and executed at the tactical level, which is measure of jointness in application of force.
The retaliation by Pakistan was intended to assess the Indian Air Defence capability, target its Air Defence system, especially the S-400 and other AD sensors and weapons to create a relatively safe environment for retaliation by PAF using their stand-off weapons, to achieve a notion of victory through visible damage to airfields or a major system like S-400. Pakistanis used the templates of recent wars by sending in hundreds of drones, rockets and missiles, which were repulsed by a robust integrated air defence shooting grid comprising of S-400, MR Sam, Akash, Pechora, OSA-AK, SPYDER and AD guns, demonstrating Indian capability to digitize and integrate legacy systems with modern systems to create an impregnable AD wall. Novel deployment of indigenous Counter-UAS systems, upgraded legacy air defence guns and innovative measures like Garud snipers shooting down drones created a counter drone wall to neutralise almost 1000 drones, rockets and missiles.
Offensive Air Defence played an important role. Offensive posture provided by the S-400 and MR SAM severely restricted freedom of operation for the PAF fighters and its AEW&C, which blunted its offensive capability. This allowed greater freedom of operation to own fighters, expanded targeting options, while pushing the enemy air assets deeper into their own territory.
The offensive air operations against military targets were undertaken in response to the sustained drone attacks against Indian military and civilian facilities. The Pakistani air defence was systematically neutralized in classical SEAD operations using both aircraft and loitering munitions while staying well inside own airspace under IACCS control and S-400 umbrella.
The intensity of offensive air operations increased on 09 and 10 May as more than 11 airfields and associated infrastructure were targeted using long range stand-off precision weapons like Brahmos, SCALP, HAMMER, SPICE and Crystal Maze. Methodical mission planning and choice of targets ensured that PAF suffered extensive damage to command-and-control facilities, aircraft hangars, runways etc. thus degrading their ability to operate, despite deployment of all available AD resources to safeguard these bases. Pakistan always relied heavily on PAF for retaliation, and this offensive use of air power by the IAF ensured serious degradation in op capability of PAF. PAF was reduced to a defensive force during this period which adversely affected its image within Pakistan. The losses suffered by PAF would be difficult to replenish.
Overall PAF could not undertake any offensive air operations and IAF established clear superiority in striking targets at varied depths while staying well within Indian air space, something which reminded one of the air superiority achieved in 1971 conflict. This also established the utility of air power as primary instrument of national power in a closely controlled escalation matrix. It once again proved the responsiveness of air power and its ability to target deep into enemy territory without expanding its visible footprint or largescale mobilisation.
Joint Operations
Joint planning and Execution are the two important ingredients of joint operations. Joint planning necessitates coordination at the highest level to ensure resources are wisely allocated for maximum effect. Execution is decentralized to ensure freedom of operation to cause maximum attrition.
All three services played their roles admirably. While IAF and IA deployed and integrated all AD assets for optimal efficiency, Indian Navy applied pressure from the Arabian Sea. IAF and IA jointly planned and executed the strikes on terror targets to telling accuracy. Consequently, the overwhelming response by the IA on the LoC and IB tied down the Pakistani Army. The simultaneous pressure applied by the three services due to close coordination, planning and execution ensured favourable outcomes. This highlights the importance of planning together at the highest level under the stewardship of CDS and also the role of the three Chiefs in warfighting and operations.
Integration of Akash Teer into IACCS was a game changer in air defence operations thus underlining importance of synergized common operating picture and management of congested air spaces involving multiple users.
Way Forward
Recent years have witnessed increasing collaboration and coordination between the three services culminating in success of operation Sindoor. This operation is ongoing and must become a permanent feature in our response to any terror attack in the future. While spectacular results have been achieved jointly with air power leading the response, the whole of nation approach adopted using diplomatic, economic and military means should continue to squeeze Pakistan.
It is opined that certain forces and assets may be allocated for 24×7 readiness with a resilient intelligence grid for a punitive response to any future terrorist action in India in matter of hours instead of days. This deterrence by punishment must become a part of our response philosophy, a clear signal to Pakistan that retribution would be swift and strong.
To achieve this specific capability development, we must fast track procurement of MRFA or a fifth-generation fighter aircraft and operationalise long-range precision weapons developed by DRDO while replenishing our stocks from abroad. Hasten operationalization of Close in Weapon System (CIWS). Procure C-UAS equipment in large quantities in consonance with future drone technologies. Hasten development and procurement of indigenous Long-Range SAM, Kusha and operationalize BMD for critical Vital Areas. Astra-2/3 must be fast tracked and Brahmos be suitably modified for LCA. There is also a need to strengthen electronic warfare suites for indigenous fighter aircraft and expand the AEW&C fleet.
Conclusion
Operation Sindoor signals strategic shift in India’s policy against terrorism. While adhering to proportionate and non-escalatory response, the intensity and breadth of response were enlarged which increased the cost for Pakistan. This operation has once again underlined the importance of airpower across the complete spectrum of operations and Jointness in maximizing the offensive and defensive effects. The operation also brought out importance of offensive application of air power to wrest initiative and impede enemy air interference.
Operation Sindoor should remain a permanent feature in our military preparedness and response. Assets should be permanently allocated to rapidly respond to any future terrorist action. This involves capability building across the entire spectrum of intelligence, resources, training, platforms, weapons across all the domains of land, sea, air, cyber and space. As the services sit down and analyse the operation, many lessons would emerge in further strengthening our deterrent posture.
